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This paper explores the impact of European integration on. member-states' policy-making processes 
and democracy. It first examines the similarities in impact, particular the diminution  in member-states' 
governmental autonomy with the subordination of national institutions to European institutions, 
whether national ministries, courts, or standard-setting bodies, and  with the loss of national control 
over national constituencies such as business interests and regional authorities. The paper then focuses 
on the differences in effects related to member-states' particular state-society relationship and on other 
factors related to country size, institutions, culture, history, and economic structure and 
competitiveness. It finds that the policy-making processes of the smaller European countries have 
suffered the greatest amount of disruption from integration, followed by France, whereas Germany, 
Britain, and Italy, for very different reasons, have so far experienced the least. 
 
 
Democracy at Risk? The Impact of European Integration on National Patterns of Policy-making 
 
  European integration has brought significant political and economic changes to the nations that 
together make up the European Union. The economic changes that have affected the state's role in the 
economy and the regulatory environment for business have been widely documented, beginning slowly 
with the removal of customs barriers in the sixties and accelerating in the eighties with the 
relinquishing of control over exchange rates; the opening of the financial markets; the ending of price 
controls; the modifications in competition policy, product standards, and sectorial rules governing 
different businesses; and all that the opening of the borders entails in terms of the free movement of 
goods, services, capital, and people. The political changes that have followed upon the economic have 
also been largely recognized, and include the new importance of European level institutions; the 
organization of interests around the EC/EU for the purposes of exerting influence over and gaining 
access to decision-making; the revision of national laws and policies in keeping with European 
regulations and directives; and the growing role of national judiciaries. 
  Less attention has been paid to the impact of these economic and political changes on national 
patterns of policy-making and business-government relations, as business looks increasingly to 
Brussels for decisions that formerly were made in national capitals and member states collectively 
make decisions formerly the purview of national governments alone. But although often overlooked, 
the impact of these political and economic changes have been significant. Not only have they 
diminished nation-state control over national institutions and national constituencies, but they have 
also combined to bring about major alterations in the balance of relations among major players in the 
policy-making process in member-states. Business generally has become stronger, more independent 
and mobile, and less in need of the close relationships with government or of the compromises with 
labor that it had developed 
throughout the postwar years. Labor, by contrast, has become weaker with respect to business at the 
same time that it has increasingly been shut out of policy-making processes by liberalizing 
governments. Finally, government has become more dependent, with Brussels having usurped much of 
its autonomy in policy formulation and much of its flexibility in policy implementation. The result is that societal interests, with the exception of business interests, have less access to decision-making at 
the national level, let alone at the supranational level. Put another way, European integration has 
increased the strength of business by freeing it from its traditional constraints at the same time that it 
has weakened the nation-state, in particular as regards the voice of the people through legislatures and 
non-business, societal interests. 
  There are those who would counter that European  integration will have strengthened the nation-
state, by reenforcing executive power and reinvigorating the rule of law;1 and that business will always 
be subject to national regulation, whatever the origin of that regulation. This is no doubt true, but it 
suggests a partial view of what constitutes strength for the executive, and implies a limited definition 
of the nation-state, since it ignores the role of legislatures and societal interests. Moreover, it entirely 
overlooks the potential impact of all of this on the state-society relationship. 
  To begin with, while the power of the executive may be enhanced, its autonomy has been 
diminished, as governments must negotiate with others on the approval of policies that in the past had 
been theirs alone, and as European institutions formulate policies that take precedence over those 
established by national institutions. Moreover, the strengthening of the executive and the judiciary 
refers primarily to powers to impose on legislative and societal interests, and not to state capacity, 
which has in many cases been weakened. By liberalizing their trade policies, by deregulating their 
economies, and by privatizing their enterprises, national governments have much less control over 
what they can do in their own territory or what their own multinationals do elsewhere, and they no 
longer have the resources they had in the past to solve social problems. 
  Most importantly for issues of democracy in the nation-state is the fact that at the same 
time that the executive may very well have been strengthened, the legislature has been weakened,  to 
say nothing of the societal interests that have increasing difficulty gaining a voice in decisions made at 
the supranational level that cannot be modified at the nation-state or local levels. In other words, 
deliberative democracy also suffers as a result of European integration. But it suffers differently, 
depending upon the nation's particular state-society relationship and on other factors related to country 
size, institutions, culture, history, and economic structure and competitiveness. 
  Within Europe, the smaller European countries have probably suffered the greatest amount of 
disruption, with the unbalancing of the corporatist relationships between business, labor, and 
government that had served them so well throughout much of the postwar period, a result of their 
increasing vulnerability to external pressures. France has also undergone significant change, with its 
statist pattern of policy-making undermined not only because of the deregulatory reforms that loosened 
the ties that traditionally bound business to government, but also because of the EU model of policy-
making that leaves French societal interests in particular with less voice. Germany, Great Britain, and 
Italy, for very different reasons, have so far experienced the least amount of change: Germany, because 
it did not have to change much to meet European and international competition or to respond to the 
requirements of European integration, although its corporatist relationship is now under siege as a 
result of unification; Great Britain, because its policies and its institutions largely anticipated the 
economic reforms required by the EU while its governments resisted other reforms that would have 
brought about major change; and Italy, because its governments have lacked the capacity to carry out 
the reforms demanded by integration, although it is now in crisis as a result. 
  Thus, nation-states are experiencing the disruptive effects of European integration at different 
rates, and although many will undergo a weakening of the nation-state and of the voice of the people, a 
few may find one or the other strengthened, Italy being a case in point. Overall, however, democracy is 
at risk. 
  None of this is to suggest that we should therefore turn back the clock, and abandon attempts at 
coordinating economic policy. It is rather to Point to the dangers inherent in these 
attempts, and to recommend that European governments begin to think today of ways of overcoming 
the greatest threats to national democracy and, by extension, to stability. The challenge for European  
nation-states is to provide new vehicles for democratic expression at the national level that also 
provide national democratic access to supranational decision-making. 
 
 
The Pressures on the Nation-State and the Diminution in Governmental Autonomy 
 
   Together with the obvious economic and political benefits to member states, European 
integration necessarily brings a diminution in governmental autonomy and, as such, represents a threat 
to national sovereignty. This has been a recognized and accepted trade-off ever since the European 
Community was set up, but it has in recent years become a matter of intense public debate, as 
integration has accelerated. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, only Prime Minister Thatchers Britain 
seemed concerned with the issue. At the time of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which 
proposed monetary union and greater political union, however, concerns about national sovereignty 
came to the fore in a number of other countries: the referendum in France passed only by a slim margin; 
the one in Denmark did not pass at all (and the subsequent referendum passed only after major 
concessions to the Danes' sovereignty concerns); none was even held in Great Britain, for fear of the 
results. Moreover, whereas 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland chose in national referenda to join the European Union, Norway 
opted out, as did Switzerland in an earlier popular vote. 
  The concerns about the threat to national sovereignty are real, although they are clearly  
offset in the view of most European governments by the benefits of European integration. They center 
primarily on the subordination of national institutions to European institutions as evidenced by the fact 
that increasingly the decisions of the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and 
European standard-setting bodies take precedence, respectively, over the decisions of national 
ministries, national courts, and national standard-setting bodies. They also involve the loss of national 
governmental control over national constituencies, in particular 
business, which has direct access at the European level, and regional authorities, which have direct 
linkages to the EC/EU, unmediated by national authorities. 
 
 
The Subordination of National Institutions 
 
 
  The loss of governmental autonomy involves not simply the fact that each member state in the 
Council of Ministers is only one of twelve, or now fifteen-here one could argue that nation-states give 
up a bit of national sovereignty to gain supranational sovereignty--but also the fact that power has 
largely been given over to the EU Commission and to the European Court of Justice. As has often been 
noted, the European Union suffers from a "democratic deficit," given a Council of Ministers that relies 
more on the European Commission and its bureaucracy for recommendations than on the European 
Parliament, which performs only a consultative role.2 This only compounds the problems at the nation-
state level, given that the EU enhances the powers of the executive to the detriment of the legislature 
and societal interests through a "two-level strategy" to overcome domestic opposition: first, through its 
mantle of legitimacy and, second, through the creation of policies by way of an insulated process that 
offers national legislatures and societal interests few opportunities for comment or change.3 The 
Maastricht reforms that gave the European Parliament a legislative function and strengthened its 
control over the executive reduced but did not eliminate this democratic deficit.4 Nor did the various 
reforms in member states that followed upon treaty ratification. 
  The EU Commission is probably the single institution that represents the greatest challenge to 
member-states' autonomy. Not only does the Commission draft the directives that governments must 
then put into practice, once passed by the Council of Ministers, but it also rules on, and overrules, 
actions that governments used to decide unilaterally in such areas as industrial policy and regional 
policy. Although member-states quite clearly participate in the formulation of policy, whether as 
official national delegates to the EU or as members of interest group lobbies seeking to influence 
policy content and agenda, not to mention as members of the Council of Ministers who approve the 
policies, the Commission plays the key role as policy initiator as well as enforcer. Moreover, its 
institutional policy-making process, by basing 
decisions primarily on technical and economic arguments, enables the Commission to maintain its 
legitimacy while denying undue political influence to any individual country or its nationals.5 The 
result is that member governments have limited control over the outcome of Commission decisions, 
regardless of the amount of political pressure they might seek to bring to bear, and despite the fact that 
their own citizens may be major players in the Commission. The Directorate-General on Competition, 
to take only one example, has in several instances not allowed the French government to provide grants to nationalized enterprises on the grounds that they were disguised subsidies, and it rejected the 
proposed acquisition of de Havilland by Aerospatiale, much to French dismay and protest.6 The 
problem for the French was that they sought to apply political pressure late in the game rather than to 
provide technical arguments that might have swayed the Commission at an early stage.7 The French 
have not been alone in experiencing this problem, however. The British, too, in the sale of Rover to 
British Aerospace, did not have early enough discussions with the European Commission and, despite 
the political intervention of Prime Minister Thatcher herself, suffered much back and forth before the 
deal was ultimately approved.8 
  The ECJ has been a less noticed, but every bit as important, force in the subversion of 
national autonomy. It has been acting as if it were the supreme court of a federal system in which it is 
the guardian of an entrenched written constitution by which it had been empowered, rather than the 
court of a loose economic federation which, although its decisions are binding on national 
governments, has no formal power over national legal systems and no enforcement powers.9 The most 
dramatic instance of this judicial activism is the case of the fishing industry in Great Britain, which the 
British government had protected against open competition by leading the charge in the Council of 
Ministers against the passage of a proposed directly  to liberalize the European fishing industry. In a 
case brought by Spanish fishermen against the British, the ECI ruled against Great Britain 
(Commission v. United Kingdom, 1991) on the grounds that the proposed directive should have been 
passed and therefore had become EC law, even though it had been defeated in the Council of 
Ministers.10 Another, less dramatic case involves the ECJ's 1987 decision that overturned the West 
German regulations limiting beer sold in Germany to that which was brewed in accordance with 
requirements established by the Bavarian Duke Wilhelm IV in 1516 and reconfirmed in 1952 (this 
made unnecessary passage of a draft directive that had been shelved since 1970 as a result of German 
brewers' opposition).11  
  Societal interests have also been able to use the ECJ to alter national practices. Although business 
groups have appealed to the ECJ the most in seeking to alter national practices that it finds not in 
conformity with EU laws and directives, social interest groups have increasingly turned to the ECJ as 
well, generally to force recalcitrant national governments to implement EC legislation. This has been 
very much the case in the United Kingdom in such areas as the quality of drinking water and equality 
between working women and men. 12 
  Another European level institution, the European Court of Human Rights, has also undermined 
governmental autonomy at the same time that it encouraged the judicialization of politics, by taking a 
procedure that had been the prerogative of the executive and making it judicial. For example, the 
ECHR's decision in a 1985 case in the Netherlands did not simply overturn the Crown's decision on an 
administrative appeal, reached on advice of the Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of 
State; it altered the procedures for appeal to the Crown and forced the upgrading of the Administrative 
Litigation Division to an independent administrative court.13 Similarly, Sweden, in response to a 
series of cases where it was found guilty of violation of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights because it had failed to provide for adjudication by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, also ended up setting up a procedure for appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court in the 
case of many decisions made by the government or an administrative board not headed by a judge.14 
  Even standard-setting in the EC/EU, although the result of complicated negotiations that can often 
result from the impetus of national standard-setting bodies or industry groups, represents a threat to 
national sovereignty. This has been especially the case since the institution of qualified majority voting 
in the EC, which has the potential of imposing on individual member-states. As it turns out, however, 
majority voting remains largely an exception to the 
consensual rule, although the possibility of a vote has encouraged compromises in areas of product 
regulation that had been blocked for years.15 Compromise does mean, however, that age-old traditions 
are sometimes placed in jeopardy, such as square gin bottles, or the British custom of hanging turkeys 
for close to four weeks, by contrast with continental customs of aging turkey for little more than two 
weeks (the compromise solution was hanging for no more than about three weeks). 16 
  Admittedly, the European Community has sought to minimize all such threats to national 
sovereignty as much as possible through the principle of subsidiarity, which seeks to ensure that 
regulation occur at the lowest administrative level possible. As a result, the EC/EU has had a marked 
preference for standardization either through directives, which leaves national governments with the 
responsibility for transposing the standard into the national legal system and implementing it, or through mutual recognition, which provides for the acceptance throughout the EU of products that 
meet the standards of one member nation (as long as national provisions do not violate primary 
Community law). Both approaches provide for greater flexibility than any set of across-the-board 
regulations, which in the early years risked being so rigid that EC regulators were sometimes said to be 
intent on regulating even the distance between the fines of forks. 
 
  The use of directives, however, also means that formal compliance through the adoption 
of a directive by the national legislature does not always lead to real compliance, that is, to 
implementation. But even when it does, it is difficult to assess that compliance because implementation 
is often of necessity very different, given different regulatory cultures and practices. 17 The regulation 
of pharmaceutical products is a case in point Harmonization and post-marketing surveillance is not 
easy, given differences in drug preference, drug expenditures, and amount of use. As a result, the 
harmonization process is lengthy and as often as not countries reject drugs that had received marketing 
authorization in one country and a favorable recommendation by the EC regulatory body. 18 The use 
of directives, thus, maintains a modicum of governmental autonomy at the risk of uneven or unequal 
application of the rules. 
  Mutual recognition is also not a panacea. For at the same time that it ensures the greatest 
governmental autonomy in standard-setting, it allows for competition among member states' regulatory 
activities. This at least in theory would enable firms to allocate their resources in such a way as to 
avoid heavy regulatory burdens, thus triggering a 'race to bottom.'19 But such a race has yet to 
materialize. And the principle of mutual recognition remains the most charitable to national autonomy 
of EC/EU processes. 
  The extension of standard-setting to a range of domains outside the original charter also threatens 
governmental autonomy. In the EC, the social field was for the most part originally placed outside the 
supranational competence of Community institutions (although coordination among member states in a 
variety of areas was recommended), and Commission activity in this area was modest between 1958 
and the end of the 1970s (with the exception of environmental policy, which began in 1967, even 
before any clear legal basis). The Single European Act of the mid eighties changed much of this, for 
example, by allowing directives in the field of occupational safety and health to be adopted by the 
Council by qualified majority vote (Article 118A), and by insisting that the Commission start from a 
high level of protection in health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection (Art. 110A), 
which represented the minimum standard for member states that were free to adopt standards at higher 
levels. Subsequently, the Maastricht Treaty added a new section on consumer protection, innovations 
in the area of occupational health and safety, qualified majority voting for most environmental 
protection measures, and even put in transport safety.20 Moreover, there is a new awareness of the 
need for increased consumer protection legislation if the single market is going to take off.21 
  Only in the welfare and labor areas has governmental autonomy remained for the most part intact. 
Member-states have essentially been left alone to deal with the crisis of the welfare state, as 
governments have had to cut back pension payments, cap unemployment compensation, and reduce 
medical reimbursements all over Europe. This is because there has so far at least not been any interest 
in establishing a European welfare state.22 But even though the social welfare policy area has 
remained largely the domain of the nation-state, with the national constituencies involved relatively 
unaffected by integration, there have been increasing spillover effects, as competition rules on 
pharmaceuticals, for example, have an impact on national health service costs, or the free movement of 
professionals and services break down borders even with regard to social delivery systems.23 
  Member-states have also had to cope individually with the problems of the labor market, and in 
particular the high rate of unemployment which was 18. I million in Europe in 1993, up from 14.3 
million in 1991, and expected to reach 19 million in 1994. Autonomy here has been a result of the 
continued member-state resistance to Europe-wide labor standards, despite national constituencies that 
have been at least indirectly affected by European integration, given governments that have tried to 
keep the lid on wages in order to resist inflationary pressures that could jeopardize their currencies and 
their place in the European Monetary System. 
  The social charter, which first carne up in 1972 and led to the drafting of a social action plan that 
sought to "advance the rights of workers by strengthening the role of unions and by imposing social 
obligations upon employers in such matters as health and safety at work, minimum wages, employee 
participation and contract hiring," 24 initially met much resistance from member states, with some concerned to retain the principle of subsidiarity and others insisting that it would be unconstitutional 
within the context of the Treaty of Rome, which was primarily economic.25 In the early eighties, by 
contrast, a combination of conservative governments, weak labor, and nervous employers proved the 
obstacle.26 Only subsequent to the Single European Act did the issue return, pushed by labor, and only 
once Jacques Delors became the EC Commission President did it become a reality, with the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers of 1989 adopted by all member states 
except Great Britain. Nonetheless, it was a 'solemn proclamation" rather than a legally binding 
document, and entirely voluntary in terms of its implementation by member states. Moreover, it was 
not included in the Maastricht Treaty, primarily because of Great Britain's threat to pull out of the 
treaty altogether if it was included.27 
  Thus, in those policy areas where nation-states currently have the greatest difficulties,  they retain 
sole jurisdiction. Moreover, the national constituencies themselves have little access or impact at the 
European level. Those served by the welfare state--in particular the poor, the elderly, the indigent, and 
the disabled, have no Europe-wide organizations to speak of. And labor, although present at the 
European level, has little effective input into the European policy-making process. The unions have 
been slow to organize at the European level, too busy trying to defend themselves against the impact of 
integration, and hampered by the lack of any pan-European labor movement. Other constituencies, 
such as regional governments and business, by contrast, have had access and influence. 
 
 
The Loss of Control over National Constituencies 
 
 
  European integration has both directly and indirectly affected national governments' control over 
business. The direct effects have been well-documented: The move to market liberalization has led to 
increased business freedom from the rigid regulations and price controls of the past, while the end to 
borders and the commitment to free movement of capital, goods, and services, has promoted business 
mobility and encouraged cross-border as well as national business concentration through merger and 
acquisition. The indirect effects have been less apparent but equally significant, and involve changes in 
the business-government relationship that follow from the direct effects of integration as well as from 
the increasing importance of European institutions in economic policy-making. The close ties between 
business and government at the national level have been loosened, with businesses that traditionally 
looked to the nation-state alone now turning to Europe as well, and with national governments that 
formerly negotiated alone for their countries now finding themselves often upstaged by national 
businesses. For business has great access and influence at the European level. 
Business is organized and represented in the European decision-making process not only indirectly 
through national governments, but also directly at the European level. Having been quick to recognize 
the need to organize together with European counterparts as well as to prepare for the new competitive 
European environment,28 business tends to be the major interest represented at the European level, by 
contrast with labor, consumer, and environmental groups that tend to be much less well organized, if 
they are present at all. Moreover, although business has no official role and business lobbies no legal 
recognition, business contact with the directorates-general of the European Commission has increased 
exponentially, with some business lobbies consulting with some directorates on a regular basis--so 
much so that the European Commission recently decided that it wanted a register of industry lobbies. 
At the national level, moreover, business tends to be consulted at the very least informally when 
international or regional negotiations affect them. 
  The nature and extent of business influence, however, varies from sector to sector. In many cases 
Euro groups have little importance except for 'fraternal contact among members, because the national 
route to influence is much more important.'29 Increasingly, however, given the qualified majority 
voting rule that means that any single country can be overridden, business interests have recognized 
that contact with EU level officials and participation in European  business associations are crucial.30 
Whether they ensure such contact directly on an individual firm basis or through their European or 
even international associations generally depends upon the perceived effectiveness of the lobby. The 
pharmaceuticals industry tends to rely on its association, which since the 1970s had to confront 
international bodies interested in imposing regulations, and has managed to turn the threat of 
transnational regulation around, influencing EC/EU proposals for patent law harmonization and using the EC/EU to challenge national pricing arrangements.31 In biotech, too, industry associations play a 
significant role, with the Commission group relying on one of the lobbying organizations, SAGB 
(Senior Advisory Group Biotechnology), a direct membership forum, for expert advice.32 In other 
sectors, however, individual firms tend to impose, as in the automotive industry, where the European 
group tends to be weak;33 and in the case of  "outsider" multinationals, such as the Japanese car 
manufacturers . 34 
  The actual impact of business on policies is of course difficult to assess because of the numbers of 
interests involved. Draft proposals of policies are revised often, and sometimes radically, following 
representations from different member states-something quite different from 
the experience of Britain and other Northern European states, where changes to published White 
papers and the like are relatively rare. One thing is clear, however: Regardless of the access, agency 
capture of the kind found in the United States is infrequent, given the range of interests seeking 
influence in each policy area,35 while clientelism of the Italian variety is also rare, given the 
bureaucratic culture that places more value on technical arguments than on political influence.36 And 
yet, business interests are sometimes invited in by the bureaucracy itself, as in the case of the ah hoc 
consultative group on chlorofluorcarbons set up by DG XI (Environment) to negotiate targets for the 
reduction of Cfs-which significantly excludes environmental and consumer interests.37 Often, 
moreover, the lack of technical knowledge by experts  leads them to rely on industry experts. All of 
this, combined with the need to make decisions quickly, means that they risk falling into quasi-
clientelistic relationships.38 But even if not, it means that business has privileged access to European 
decision-making that complements its long-standing access at the national level. Moreover, it suggests 
that policy interactions have shifted from an almost exclusive reliance on national government 
bargaining to one that includes, if it is not dominated by, business actors in the transnational private 
sector.39 
  Business, in short, has become an increasingly independent actor in Europe. Interestingly enough, 
this increasing independence has not generated near the worry that one might have expected from 
national governments. On the contrary, business has often been welcomed by national governments as 
full partners in the negotiation process, primarily because they remain convinced for the moment at 
least that whatever nationally-based businesses consider to be in their own interests is also in the 
national interest.40 By contrast, there has been great concern in national capitals over the increasing 
independence of regional governments. The direct linkages with Europe that provide them with outside 
sources of funding have only enhanced the powers that local authorities in many European countries 
gained in the seventies and eighties through decentralization reforms.41 And although national 
policymakers on the whole appreciate the need for European  regional policy and structural funds, 
whether because of the problems of uneven development generated by internal market and monetary 
and fiscal 
convergence or the risks Of the "beggar-my-neighbor' characteristics of American states and 
municipalities where there is a lack of control over national spatial development incentives,42 they 
regret the loss of national control over regional authorities that European intervention entails.43 
  National governments' concern over their loss of control, of course, differs greatly from 
one country to the next. The French, needless to say, with their long history of centralization and 
regional level governments that alone in Europe are entirely without independent legislative powers, 
have been disquieted by the trend.44 But it is probably Great Britain, which has recentralized in recent 
years, that is likely to be the most threatened by it.45 There is no room here to go into the specifics of 
the different countries' views of the new relationship between the European Union and the regions, but 
suffice to say that most countries are uneasy about the loss of power and control over the regions, with 
some in addition fearing that Europe will only encourage their own regions with strong autonomy 
movements to challenge the nation-state's power over them, Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque region, 
and Corsica being cases in point.46 
  Thus, the European Union, whether through policy recommendations, court decisions, 
standardization procedures, or business and regional access and influence, has in many different ways 
undermined the autonomy of national governments. No one is complaining much, however, because in 
exchange for the loss of autonomy has come a larger market, higher standards generally, better 
protection for all citizens of the EU, and greater economic stability. Moreover, national governments 
have found that the economic challenges represented by European integration have provided incentives 
for change that would not otherwise be there, while the policy imperatives created by European integration have for the most part enabled them to overcome the resistance of entrenched interests and 
the institutional hurdles to change. 
  What most national governments overlook in their assessment of the impact of European 
integration, however, are the problems related to democracy and democratic access to decision-making. 
These have the potential of becoming a destabilizing element for national governments in cases where 
citizens feel cut out of the decision-making process and disadvantaged by European integration. But 
the nature and degree of threat here differs from one country to the next. 
 
 
National Responses to European Pressures and the Changes in Governmental Policy-making Processes 
 
 
  The unwritten story behind European integration lies not so much in how the European Union is 
diminishing the autonomy of the nation-state or in how business and regions are escaping nation-state 
control, but in how the political and economic changes brought about by European integration have in 
turn affected nation-states' policy-making processes. These changes have in most instances undermined 
the nation-state's particular kind of democracy by strengthening executive power vis-a-vis societal 
interests and freeing business from its traditional constraints. But this has occurred in different ways, a 
function not only of the particular state-society relationship embodied in the policy-making process 
(corporatist, statist, or pluralism, but also on such factors as country size (small or large), culture, and 
history; governmental structure (federal or unitary) and capacity (to reform or not); labor history 
(conflictual or consensual) and organization (cohesive or fragmented); business size (large or small), 
organization (cohesive or fragmented) and orientation (domestic or international); and on the degree of 
opening to the outside as well as the extent to which the nation had to change in order to meet the 
competitive challenges created by the new international economic environment. Moreover, different 
European countries have experienced these changes to differing degrees, with the smaller European 
countries and France the most affected, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy the least. 
 
 
The Smaller European Countries: Unbalancing the Corporatist Relationship 
 
 
  In recent years, the corporatist systems of social concentration developed by the smaller European 
countries in the postwar period, in which business and labor, represented by peak associations, together 
with government, represented by state agencies, formulate and implement policy, often absent any 
independent role for parliament, has become unbalanced, although for some this came much sooner 
than for others.47 The pressures of internationalization that include membership in the European 
Community have been major contributing factors, and this despite the fact that small European states 
with corporatist policy processes had been thought more capable of responding to outside challenges 
because of their tripartite relationships than larger states.48 The problem is that the traditional "class 
compromise" that has helped explain the stability of corporatist polities49 no longer works in a world 
of capital mobility and financial integration, where labor rightly sees business less bound to it, morally 
or economically, and where business can obtain concessions from both labor and government without 
the traditional compromise. Governments, moreover, no longer able to use public spending programs 
to reconcile the conflicting demands of labor and business as they had in the past without running into 
macroeconomic trouble (given a financial world that sees any such action as contributing to 
inflationary pressures, a signal for capital outflow and foreign currency speculation), have had less 
interest in maintaining the old tripartite arrangements, promoting change instead by embracing market-
oriented policies.50 
  This has been occurring at different rams in different small European states primarily in relation to 
their degree of openness to international financial and business pressures. While such EU members as 
the Netherlands, an ideal-typical corporatist state, and Belgium, much lower on the corporatist scale, 
found their particular brands of social concertation in jeopardy by the early eighties, non-EC members 
Austria, the other ideal-typical corporatist state, and Sweden were able to delay the impact of 
international economic constraints until the late eighties.   EC membership, of course, has been only one of a number of factors that help explain the 
vulnerability of the social concertation systems of small European countries. In addition to this, one of 
the major differences between Belgium and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and Austria and Sweden 
on the other, has been that the former countries have had strong, internationally oriented financial 
institutions that acted as major advocates of financial integration and trade liberalization, while the 
latter have not. On top of this have been institutional differences involving the size, organization, and 
orientation of business concerns: Swedish and Austrian business associations have been large and 
cohesive, with Swedish business, although large and  international, as domestically rooted as smaller 
and non-international Austrian business (with the exception of state-owned enterprises). By contrast, 
Belgian business and its associations have been divided culturally along linguistic lines as well as in 
terms of size, while Dutch business and its associations have been divided along domestic/international 
orientation lines. There have also been differences in labor history and organization, with Swedish and 
Austrian unions large and cohesive, with a history of consensual relations with business, while Belgian 
and Dutch union have been more fragmented and conflictual. 
  Finally, there have been political differences, in particular social democratic governments that 
continued their commitment to the social welfare state in Austria and Sweden long after Belgium and 
the Netherlands' had elected center-fight governments that sought to cut back social spending and 
government intervention in the market economy.51 But this only meant that Austria and Sweden were 
able put off the inevitable a bit longer, although the signs of strain in the corporatist relationship were 
increasingly apparent.52 By the nineties, Austria and Sweden have also begun embracing the changes, 
membership in the EU among them: Sweden, pushed by the collapse of its currency and the election of 




Germany: Corporatism under Siege 
 
 
  Germany, although also generally characterized as a corporatist nation, has not had the same 
problems as the smaller European  nation-states.53 Given its position as the lead economy in the 
European Union and one of the most advanced of advanced industrialized nations, it has not been 
vulnerable to the same external pressures as the smaller European nation-states. With the mark the lead 
currency in the European Monetary System, Germany, or more specifically its independent central 
bank, the Bundesbank, has set monetary policy for all the EMS members, and has led all the other EU 
countries in imposing restrictive monetary policies and austerity budgets to guard against inflation. But 
whereas for Germany, the past few years of austerity and relatively high interest rates has proven 
salutory, given the pressures resulting from unification with East Germany, for many other European 
countries this has often entailed deeper recession, given that the even higher interest rates that they had 
to impose in order to keep their currencies well within the band of fluctuation of the EMS, have slowed 
growth and dampened their economies unnecessarily (and in the cases of Great Britain and Italy, even 
led them to leave the EMS for a time). 
  The level of internationalization of German business, which has made it one of the major export 
nations in the world second only to Japan, together with its particular business structure, with the close 
business-banking partnership that provides long-term, low-cost financing at the same time that it 
protects it from takeovers, has also made German business less vulnerable to outside pressures and 
more resilient. Moreover, Germany's social concertation system had made possible innovations in 
production systems, and in particular the move from Fordism to flexible specialization,54 that spared it 
the radical restructuring that businesses of other nations went through from the late seventies on. It is 
only very recently that German firms have begun the rationalizing of operations and the shedding of 
workers that have been endemic to most other advanced industrialized nations with the exception of 
Japan (which is also only now experiencing such pressures). As a result, Germany has managed to 
maintain its corporatist set of relationships intact much longer than the smaller, corporatist European 
countries. 
  In other ways that have more direct impact on the corporatist form of democracy, Germany has 
also not suffered from the ill-effects of integration. Because Germany has been committed to the "three 
'Cs': consensus, corporatism and cooperative federalism," and because that consensus is institutionalized, both the 'social partners' in the tripartite relationship and the 'governmental partners' 
in the federal system have had access to supranational decision-making. Business and labor 
associations have been largely included in deliberations involving major moves forward on European 
integration (e.g.., with conferences held in 1988 on the implications of the Single Act), while the l. 
Länder, which play a major role in policy implementation in a great number of areas affected by EU 
regulation, have been largely brought into the policy formulation process by the federal government55  
  Most importantly, perhaps, German institutions did not have to change much to respond to the 
requirements of European economic integration. To begin with, the German federal system, with its 
emphasis on the importance of law as a regulatory instrument and its respect for local government 
parallels EU practice in the first instance and is supported by the EU principle of subsidiarity in the 
second.56 Moreover, the central bank was already independent, unlike in France and Italy (until 1993). 
In addition, Germany had no need to alter its business- government relationship, especially as 
compared to France. Not only was the government already less present in the economy in terms of 
nationalized enterprise (at least compared to France subsequent to the 1981 nationalizations), but the 
government also played no formal interventionist role in the economy, although it provided subsidies 
and the like for key industries on an ad hoc basis. 
  This is not to suggest, however, that Germany is the ideal, market-oriented economy. Much the 
contrary, as other European nations increasingly discovered, once their businesses were successfully 
blocked from acquiring German companies by the German BundesKartellamt on alleged anti-trust 
grounds, and once they saw the level of subsidies provided business by the .Länder. In fact, despite the 
formal governmental commitment to market-orientation since the end of World War II, German 
business relations have generally been characterized more by cooperation than competition, aided by 
the banks that sit on the boards of competing firms and, as both a source of credit for and an owner of 
equity in major German firms, often play the kind of leadership role for industry that the government 
plays in France.57 
  European integration, in short, has not jeopardized Germany's corporatist democracy because it 
has been protected by the power of its economy and the nature and organization of its institutions. 
Germany nevertheless today finds its corporatist relationship under siege, the result of unification with 
East Germany. The signs of strain are at the margins of society, reflected in the rise of anti-foreigner 
sentiment and in the rise of right-wing extremism. They are brought about by the high unemployment 
rates and adjustment problems experienced in the former East Germany, as well as by the malaise in 
the former West Germany related among other things to growing ambivalence with regard to 
unification and resentment of its costs. 
 
 
France: The Statist End to Old-Style Statism 
 
 
  While Germany is one of the EU countries that has so far felt the least change, France is one that 
has felt the most. France's statist pattern of policy-making, where governments have typically 
formulated policy unilaterally but allowed societal interests in at the implementation stage with the 
politics of accommodation, cooperation, or confrontation, has been disrupted by European 
integration.58 This is not only because of the major deregulatory reforms that have transformed the 
economy from a state-led into a more market-oriented one59 thereby loosening the ties that have 
traditionally bound business and government, or because of the decentralizing reforms that have 
transferred national powers and resources to local authorities.60 It is also because governments have 
lost autonomy at the formulation stage, given the primacy of Brussels, and they have lost flexibility at 
the implementation stage, given the EU regulatory model that brooks no exceptions to the rule, 
ensuring that societal interests will find less accommodation, and may therefore have to resort to more 
confrontation. 
  The French business-government relationship, to begin with, has changed dramatically as a result 
of European integration.61 For France, membership in the European Community, with its "liberal" bias, 
has from the very beginning acted as a major spur for French governments to move away from then 
traditional dirigiste or state-directed, economy to one with a greater emphasis on the market.62 The 
conflict between the two competing strands of economic management policy, that is, of dirigisme and 
liberalism, came to a head in 1983, when the socialist government, faced with a choice between abandoning major elements of its dirigiste policies or the European Community (and in particular the 
EMS that it had joined in 1979), decided to remain in the EC and, therefore, in favor of liberalism. 
French exceptionalism could not last long in an increasingly interdependent, global economy and in an 
integrating Europe. Thereafter, the strict monetary policies and economic austerity program that 
diminished government resources almost guaranteed the further liberalization of the economy since, no 
onger able to stimulate industry through demand, the socialists had to tut to more supply-side measures 
in order to improve the competitiveness of French industry, with deregulation a top priority.63 The 
return of the center-right in 1986 only brought further state disengagement with extensive privatization 
and deregulation, and this essentially continued when the socialists returned to power in 1988, with 
deregulation and privatization, either officially or unofficially, remaining the order of the day, pushed 
by the imperatives of European integration as well as the capital needs of firms. State ownership was 
progressively diminished and state control weakened in favor of the creation of a truly mixed economy 
in which public and private, nationalized and privatized financial and industrial concerns own and 
control one another through cross shareholdings following the German model of banking-industry 
partnership. By the nineties, the traditional dirigisme in which French governments set macroeconomic 
policy relatively independently of the international economic climate and engaged in 
micromanagement of the microeconomic sphere had ended. 
  The result is that the ties that traditionally bound French business to government have been 
loosened. Business has become increasingly independent of the state, and not only in consequence of 
the deregulatory policies that divested the state of its traditional dirigiste instruments. As business has 
been increasingly subject to the imperatives of world competition, the constraints of the market, and 
the demands of technological advancement, it has looked less to government for guidance, And as 
alternative sources of financing have grown as a result of the opening of the markets along with the 
internationalization of capital, business has turned less to government for support. Moreover, as French 
big businesses have gotten bigger, consolidating, concentrating, and expanding worldwide in response 
to the challenge of European competition, other supranational firms have become their allies and the 
EU their interlocutor. French business now has the kind of access to policy formulation at the EU level 
that it never had at the national level, where lobbying has traditionally been regarded as illegitimate, 
and it has been encouraged in this by the national government itself.64 
  While French business has become freer from the traditional constraints, French government has 
become less free. European integration has generally diminished governmental autonomy in policy 
formulation, as we have already seen, at the same lime that it has done little to enhance the powers of 
national parliaments, which in the case of France are already exceedingly meager. Most dangerous for 
France's statist model of democracy, however, is that it has diminished governmental flexibility at the 
implementation stage. In the statist model, societal interests that traditionally have had little input into 
policy formulation have generally been accommodated at the implementation s/age, where civil 
servants as often as not adjusted the rules to respond to interest group needs in order to avoid potential 
confrontation. This approach to implementation, summed up in de Tocqueville's famous phrase: 'The 
rule is rigid but the application flexible,' is in jeopardy. Because the EU regulatory model regards any 
exceptions to the rule as illegitimate, its increasing presence has called into question the administrative 
nature of the French state, where making exceptions is the rule. Societal interests that have little access 
to EU policy-making, by contrast with business, will therefore find themselves increasingly shut out of 
any direct access to the decision-making process at both the front and the back ends. And, finding less 
accommodation, they may engage in more confrontation, albeit with less success. This has been most 
apparent in the agricultural sector in the context of the GATT talks. 'Vegetables on the highways and 
pigs in the street," however, have not been as effective as they have in the past, because the 
government is no longer as free to bend, or not, to the pressures of confrontation.65 
  In short, although Euro integration has encouraged modernization of France's economic 
institutions, it has generated a crisis for France's political institutions, as citizens and their elected 
representatives find themselves increasingly frozen out of the policy-making process. Policy-making is 
left to only a few top elected officials--speaking generally through their civil service representatives; to 
large. business interests--speaking either directly or through their lobbies; and to bureaucrats, whether 
those at the EC level responsible for formulating policy or those at the national level responsible for 
implementing them. The crisis manifests itself in the 
increasing disillusionment with government officials and the attacks on then' probity; in the 
disaffection of the electorate and the rising extremism of the right; and in the general malaise that comes from the increasing banality of political discourse and the lack of new ideas that have followed 
the disintegration of left-wing and right-wing ideological divisions. Until the French find a way to 
adapt their statist model of democracy to the new realities, the crisis is likely only to deepen. 
 
 
Great Britain: Liberal Staffsin with a Difference 
 
 
  Great Britain has felt the impact of integration much less than has France, despite the fact that it, 
too, has a statist pattern of policy-making, where governments can formulate policy absent significant 
interest group input. This is because Great Britain in some ways anticipated the changes demanded by 
European integration, in particular with regard to the business-government relationship, and in others 
successfully resisted them, especially with regard to social regulation. 
  Great Britain has historically had a more laissez-faire ideology, more open financial markets, and 
a less close business-government relationship than either France or Germany. To begin with, 
throughout the postwar era, it has had a more 'liberal' and international approach to economy policy 
than most of its European neighbors, often sacrificing the domestic economy on the altar of its 
ambition to remain a world power. Whether the policy involved deflating the economy in order to 
maintain a strong pound sterling or restraining domestic investment in an effort to strengthen the 
balance of payments--which was, as Andrew Shortfield noted, 'like a blind man with a single automatic 
gesture at his command'-the government put international economic considerations above those of 
domestic economic health.66 And they seem to have continued this under Thatcher and Major, with 
laissez-faire ideology substituting for world ambitions, and openness to the Japanese a Trojan horse in 
the EU, at least as other member-states see it. 
  Moreover, although Great Britain, like France, has traditionally had a powerful executive and 
strong bureaucracy, it has also had "an abiding prejudice which sees it as the natural business of 
government to react-not to act," in particular with regard to business.67 This cultural aversion to 
government intervention in the economy, combined with the size of. its markets, has always ensured 
the government a smaller role with regard to economic matters, and problems whenever it tried either 
statist experiments similar to those of France in the planning sphere or corporatist ones in the social 
concertation sphere.68 Thus, although the executive is strong, as in the ideal-typical statist model, it is 
so in a limited sphere. It was this strength, however, that enabled Prime Minister Thatcher, once 
elected in the late seventies, to begin her radical program of privatization and deregulation, even before 
the pressures of European integration seemed to demand it.69 
  Great Britain, in short, has been if anything ahead of the European Community in the economic 
arena, in macroeconomic and microeconomic policies as well as in its openness to the international 
economy, and therefore less vulnerable because already responsive to the pressures which hit both 
France and the smaller European countries hard. Moreover, although it has in some sense been behind 
European member-states in the social arena, it has managed to avoid some of the potentially most 
onerous (in its view) aspects, in particular with regard to the social charter (as discussed above). 
  What is more, Great Brittain's particular form of liberal statist democracy has up until now been 
little affected by integration, especially by comparison with France. Because of the traditional role of 
Parliament as a forum for the vigorous debate of ideas, society through its parliamentary 
representatives at the very least has the appearance (although not necessarily to reality) of having had 
more voice on the whole set of issues related to integration than did France, where there was little 
discussion until the debate on the Maastricht referendum. Because the rule of law is more respected in 
Great Britain (and Germany) than in France (given not only the politics of accommodation but also the 
dependent position of judges up until very recently), the European model of regulation has not been as 
disruptive as it has been in France at the implementation stage--much the contrary, as Great Britain has 
one of the best records on implementation of EU directives. And because British common law is 
similar in its precedent- 
setting approach to that of the EU, the validity of European Court of Justice decisions has not been 
questioned as much as in France. 
  In one area, however, Great Britain is likely to have increasing problems. Because Great Britain 
alone among European  member-states has recentralized, taking power back from local governments, it 
is likely to find the subsidiarity principle as it applies to subnational authorities increasingly difficult to reconcile not only with its own policies toward local governments, but also with its own use of the 
subsidiarity principle to defend against the further shift of powers to EU institutions.70 
 
 
Statism, Italian-Style: Paralysis followed by Crisis 
 
 
  Like Great Britain, Italy has changed less in response to the pressures of European integration than 
has France, but not from a lack of need. Italy has been unable to carry out the reforms required by 
integration, given a statist polity characterized by a weak executive and parliamentary paralysis. Its 
current on-going economic and political crises result from this as well as from the internal collapse of 
its institutions stemming from corruption scandals. 
  Unlike France or many of the smaller EU member-states, Italy has yet to shift to strict monetary 
policies and to submit to the discipline of the market. During the eighties, in fact, at a time when other 
EC members were deregulating, privatizing, and instituting austerity budgets to reduce inflation and 
deficits, Italy was not. Despite Italy's enthusiasm for going forward with European integration, seeing 
this as a way of reinforcing the executive from the outside, much of its actions remain in violation of 
Maastricht guiding principles. For example, although Maastricht recommends an open market 
economy with free competition favoring an efficient allocation of resources, Italy only recently 
recognized the market economy; it had no competition law until 1990; it continued direct interventions 
on prices and quantities, thus distorting resource allocation; and persisted in providing state subsidies 
and other aid to public sector companies. It also fell short on the Maastricht recommendations for 
public finance, the monetary regime, and the financial regime, having failed to monitor sufficiently 
government deficits (now 1.7 times the EC average) and public debt (now at 1.7 times larger than that 
of the G-7 nations). The principle of full independence of the central bank was ensured only in 1993 
(before it only had limited operational independence); and price stability has yet to become the 
monetary regime's primary objective. Moreover, in the financial regime, credit controls remained 
between 1973 and 1983 (and occasionally later), while restrictions on capital outflows continued from 
1973 to 1990.71 
  Much of the problem for Italy has been its particular model of statist policy-making, which is 
ideal-typically weak by comparison with France's ideal-typically strong one. Rather than the state 
appearing an entity apart from governing parties, in then' service but independent of them, 
administered and embodied by a bureaucratic elite that is impermeable to outside interests, Italy has 
been characterized by "partitocrazia" or party government. In Italy, parties predominate, controlling the 
state, with parties deciding what to send to parliament and dominating the interest articulation process, 
such that where groups exercise influence, they do so as clients and/or patrons of political parties. But 
despite the fact that one party dominated Italian politics for forty-five years, this is not a one party 
system in which all the rewards are solely for party members. Rather, it is the system of 
consociativismo, or consociationalism, in which opponents are coopted by bringing them into the 
governmental machinery, ensuring compromise and coexistence such that even disagreements over 
substantive policy issues do not jeopardize governing coalitions (although they may lead to the 
creation of new governments and cabinet reshuffling). The result is the system sottogoverno in which 
Italian state and society have virtually been colonized by political parties, with the spoils that include 
jobs in the bureaucracy and in state-owned firms apportioned according to the electoral weight of the 
parties, including the Communists.72 
  Just recently, this system has collapsed under the weight of the pressures of European 
integration, the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the communist threat that had served to justify the 
consociative balance, and, most importantly, the corruption that by the early nineties had careened out 
of control as dramatized by the mani pulite, or clean hands, and tangentopoli or bribe city, scandals. 
With this collapse, many changes are likely to occur, although when remains questionable since the 
reform of the electoral system has not as yet led to any other major institutional reforms. 
  The executive has yet to produce the promised deregulatory and privatization laws, in large 
measure because parliamentary paralysis remains, a result of the fact that the parliament is a 
transformative rather than arena legislature, with government lacking the parliamentary mechanisms 
that ensure passage of its programs, as in France or Great Britain. And there has been no change so far 
in the structure or culture of the bureaucracy. Most importantly, however, even if the reforms are passed, there is some question as to whether they will hold since Italy continues to be characterized by 
a process of policy-making that goes way beyond France in following the principle that ensures that 
rigid rules are bent in the implementation. In other words, the future may very well mimic the past, 
when 'the formal dirigisma of these state-sponsored reforms was belied in practice,' with the threatened 
interests managing to resist changes 'through evasions or to get changes in policy or its implementation 
that frustrate the global intentions of the reforms,'73 and where confrontation was an accepted course 
of action when accommodation or co-optation were not available.74 
  This, of course, was "democracy, Italian style.'75 But it is a style that, much as in France, will be 
increasingly at odds with the demands of the European regulatory model. Unlike France, however, 
where it is the bureaucracy that has been leading the changeover to this model, in Italy, it is most likely 
to be the judiciary, which has proven itself in the recent scandals, and which is the only self-governing 






  Thus, the impact of European  integration has been varied, with some countries' policy-making 
processes more adversely affected than others, a result of their particular state-society relations, 
histories, institutions, and economies. All have nevertheless experienced some impact from integration, 
and this is likely only to increase over time, given that the overall 
balance of forces has changed: While business has for the most part become stronger and more 
independent of national governments, labor has become weaker in relation to business and to 
liberalizing governments which have themselves, in turn, become more dependent upon Brussels, 
having lost much of their autonomy in policy formulation and flexibility in policy implementation. 
Most societal interests, with the exception of business interests, as a result, have less access to 
decision-making at the national as well as European level. 
  This lack of access is not necessarily a problem in cases where societal interests remain convinced 
that governments are representing their interests at the national as well as European level. But as 
national governments have continued to deregulate and privatize, to reduce taxes, and to diminish their 
own control over economic policies generally, they have generally had less and less capacity to meet 
societal needs in the face of economic downturn, especially in such areas as employment and social 
welfare. The result is that those societal interests whose needs have not been met have become 
increasingly disenchanted both with national governments and the supranational agreements into 
which they have entered, and have become a potentially disruptive force. Unless nation-states make 
then' citizens feel that they are participating in the supranational decisions that increasingly affect then' 
lives, the legitimacy of both the European Union and the nation-state will be increasingly open to 
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